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BLAKE, HEGEL, AND THE SCIENCES
tilottama rajan , University of Western Ontario
In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel calls nature “the
negative of the Idea,” an alien existence where spirit does not find itself.
He also describes it as a “frozen” or “petrified intelligence,” attributing
thephrase to Schelling (Hegel,Nature 14–15). Schelling’sAges of theWorld
(1815), posthumously published only in 1861 and so unavailable to Hegel,
does indeed begin with a geological unconscious that impedes any pro-
gressive narrative of cosmic or human history, as time is locked in a “ro-
tatory movement” that blocks any “true beginning” or “veritable end”
(Schelling, Ages 20). However, the text Hegel evokes is not Schelling’s
Ages but his earlier System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), and it is
Hegel who adds the words “erstarrte [congealed]” and “versteinerte [pet-
rified],” sometimes translated as “fossilized.”1 For in the System Schelling
had seen no resistance betweenmatter and spirit, nonliving and living be-
ing, envisioning a seamless process that resolves “the whole of nature . . .
into an intelligence” (6). Hegel invokes the Schelling of the Identity phi-
losophy because he too wants an Aufhebung of “the dead and uncon-
scious products of nature” that overcomes the resistance of the inorganic
to organization, as life self-organizes towards spirit (Schelling, System 6).
Following this program, Alison Stone, in her book of that name, sees
“petrified intelligence” as figuring an unconsciously rational activity in
nature, whereby, as Hegel moves up the Chain of Being from minerals
to man, he forges increasingly tight concept-matter relations that bring
the logics of nature and mind into identity. Stone thus sees Hegel as of-
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fering a “strong a priori reading” of nature as determined in advance by
the structures of consciousness (6, 57–59), rather than as more riskily ex-
posing thought to its immanent entanglement in nature. In her view
the Philosophy of Nature successfully enacts the dialectic, as each stage
in the Idealist Stufenfolge or Stufengrade—the graduated stages through
which nature learns to make man—resolves a contradiction in the pre-
vious stage (60–61): or as Coleridge puts it, using a similarly dialectical
logic in a fragment on “The Scale of Life” (1825), “problems” exist at a
“lower grade” that “find their solution . . . higher up in the scale” (2: 1194).
Yet the word “petrified” recurs in the geology section of Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Nature, retrojecting a materiality onto its initial use that im-
pedes the sublation into metaphor necessary for this dialectic. Hegel
writes of “petrified wood,” “huge forests . . . flattened down and buried
under masses of debris.” Mixed up with “petrified shell-fish and huge
bones” of mammoths, this “confused mass” is a ruin found across all
continents, crushing any progressive history or anthropology (280). This
congealed existence precedes but affectively coexists with the division
of earth into sea and land, continents, Old and New Worlds (278). Re-
turning to a time before Europe and America, Blake’s (First) Book of
Urizen likewise opens with the undead, with “forests” that are a “petrific,
abominable chaos” (3.23–26; E 71). Against this geo-catastrophic begin-
ning, the Euro-American anthropology by which Blake launches history
toward apocalypse in the continental prophecies, like Hegel’s equally
chauvinistic Philosophy of History, is no more than a regional project:
a project and projectile that Blake figures in The Book of Ahania through
thefiery beamof Fuzon that Los, after five hundred years, can do nomore
than senselessly beat in a “mass” (2.44–48; E 85).
Hegel’s petrificationof spirit inmatter has two aspects. First, it “halt[s]”
history, because the earth has nogenesis; earth “endures” rather than “pro-
duces itself” (Hegel, Nature 279), like Wordsworth’s “woods decaying,
never to be decayed,” which the halted traveller of The Prelude can sub-
limate only through a forced idealism (1805: 6.557). For Hegel the earth is
not a “living creature,”whereas in the animal organism that is his increas-
inglyproblematicgoal“eachmember isproduct andalsoproductive” (Na-
ture 278–9). This integrationallows events andentities to beproduced, but
only as what David Krell, discussing German Idealism, calls “botched,”
though necessary, “attempts at depicting the absolute” (96–97). Yet it is
not that earth has no history, since it contains the sedimented strata of
numerous times that have been put under erasure. It is just that the his-
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tory in question is not a progressive history with a beginning, purpose,
and end.
Second, the earth Hegel describes is a fossilized world that moves in
the opposite direction from any awakening into spirit. The fossil-world
speaks of extinction. In it, what was once alive is now (un)dead; what is
yet to happen is already over, preserved only as the ruin thatWalter Ben-
jamin calls natural history: “the facies hippocratica of history as a petri-
fied, primordial landscape” without “redemption” (166). Worth noting,
as well, is where Hegel’s discussion of geology comes in the Philosophy
of Nature. ThoughHegel describes the earth as a “mechanical organism”
because its “members”donot “contain the life-processwithin themselves”
(Nature 278), he takes up geology in the last division, on “Organics.” This
division follows Mechanics and Physics, and moves, in a further triad,
from the terrestrial, through the plant, to the animal organism. The earth,
in other words, marks a resistance to the concept of organism that is not
before organism and organization but within it as its unconscious.
The Philosophy of Nature differs from Schelling’s System in two ways,
both relevant to the Urizen books, inasmuch as Urizen itself constitutes
Blake’s Naturphilosophie, while The Book of Los is the aesthetic this Na-
turphilosophie dis-spirits or de-generates. First, while the System syn-
chronically parallels nature and spirit,2 Hegel temporalizes this transition
as a labor of the negative whose difficult details cast the project in doubt.
For as he poignantly concludes, “Nature’s ever-increasing wealth of de-
tail” is “refractory towards the unity of theNotion” (Nature 444). Second,
Hegel remediates the Stufenfolge as a Stufenfolge der Wissenschaften. He
provides an account not of the graduated stages of nature but of a grad-
uated series of disciplines and fields describing these stages, thus conced-
ing that these evolutionary stages are an intellectual construction.3 The
three main divisions of this epistemic Stufenfolge—Mechanics, Physics,
and Organics—then enfold subfields like mineralogy, meteorology, cos-
mology, and pathology. Some, like meteorology, recur in more than one
division, as Hegel restlessly views a field of knowledge through different
optics, unraveling his attempt at a rigorous succession of disciplines that
will demonstrate reason in nature. The various sciences can be compared
to the shapes of mind in the Phenomenology. Indeed Hegel borrows the
narrative pathos of the Phenomenology in similarly configuring the raw
materials of his Jena lectures on nature as a narrative when arranging
them for hisEncyclopedia, of which thePhilosophy ofNature is the second
part. Moreover, Hegel’s relation to these sciences, which he cannot ar-
range in an ascent (after all, he ends with pathology), autobiographically
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repeats spirit’s relation to nature. For the sciences, he says, are “man’s
non-organic nature,” which he must digest and make his own (Nature
276). This self-thematization throws the sciences, as shapes of mind that
try to grasp alien material by imposing consciousness onto dark matter,
reflexively back on themetaphysical conceit of trying tomake nature into
“the mirror of ourselves” and thus into “a free reflex of Spirit” (Nature
445).
Blake cannot be said to organize the sciences in an ascent, being des-
perately caught in their consequences. To avoid their impact, inMiltonhe
binds art and science to a conservative metaphysical binary, writing that
. . . in Eternity the Four Arts: Poetry, Painting, Music,
And Architecture which is Science: are the Four Faces of Man.
Not so in Time & Space: there Three are shut out, and only
Science remains thro Mercy: & by means of Science, the Three
Become apparent in Time & Space, in the Three Professions
Poetry in Religion: Music, Law: Painting, in Physic & Surgery.
(27.55–60; E 125)
Here art is a potentiality in eternity that is obscured in “Time & Space,”
while science is used in its older sense of systematized knowledge. But
in this passage science is metaphysically subordinated so as to protect
a transcendental idealismof art, functioning at best as a distorting vehicle
for art, but not as a catalyst that might change the very nature of art. So,
for example, when music passes through the analytic filter of science it
degenerates into law. The case of architecture is revealing. It “is” science
because of its mathematical elements, which led Kant to align system
with architectonic (690). That it is also clearly an art allows “science”
to be redeemed, but only by being harmonized and aestheticized, sub-
lated into a romantic ideology of art.
In Urizen, however, Blake feels the trauma of the specific fields we
now call sciences: geology, biology, embryology. In his (self-critical) char-
acter of the Eternals, Blake therefore demonizes Urizen to close off the
metaphysical void of a naturalistic world (3.4; E 70). The poemopenswith
a world “shut in the deep,” unseen “changes” in “desolate mountains,”
“seas,” “thunders,” an “abominable chaos.” (3.10–11, 24–26, 31–4; E 70–
71). “Some sa[y]” this abandoned life is Urizen (3.5; E 70), and following
their lead Blake projects a tyrannical and restrictive power to contain the
disruptive eco-ontological effects described in the opening through a bi-
nary of reason and imagination that does not explain these phenomena.
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To ground this phantasmology of knowledge, Blake constructs a pan-
theon that he populates with uncouth names by which he tries to digest
the non-organic andmake it his own, hysterically piling onmore names
in further texts. But the human may be only an episode in a pre- and
post-human world. So to anthropomorphize this world and locate a
power we can fight, Blake attributes this world and its “armies” to Urizen
(5.16; E 73), though at this point the part-subject Urizen has yet to emerge.
Since Urizen’s genesis comes afterwhat is described as “his” “world,” it is
unclear if the subject precedes and commands the predicate, if Urizen is
a substance with attributes, or if attributes produce the substantive Uri-
zen as compensation and explanation. And indeed before these changes
in which he is hypostatized and disastrously metastasizes, Urizen is de-
scribed only in negatives, as “unknown,” a “vacuum,” a congealed effect
more than a cause: an “obscure separation” (Urizen 3.2, 5–6, 5.40; E 70, 73).
Yet in the passage from Milton, Blake does allow science a half-life
“throMercy.” Evenmore intriguing, he locates the debased form of paint-
ing in “Physic & Surgery.” It is as if he senses in science a potential ob-
scured by his own equation of the sciences with system. Is it possible that
science, instead of being the enemy of imagination, might be the condi-
tion of possibility for a less transcendental aesthetic, wherein “Physic &
Surgery,” rather than being reduced forms of “Painting,” open up new
forms of art? Blake did scientific engraving for Basire, and his own en-
gravings bear the impression of medical and scientific illustration (Con-
nolly 34–60). Might his visual plates, particularly in Urizen, be part of a
genealogy in which medical and scientific illustration open pathways to
new forms of art such as surrealism?
The Eternals in Urizen resist such metaphysical and aesthetic climate
change with “fury” and “intense indignation” (4.44; E 72). Thereafter they
abscond from the world of generation and stand “wide apart” (5.41; E 73).
Returning after seven ages of witness protection, they ask that a “tent” be
“spread,”which seems also to be a templewith “pillars” (19.2–7; E 78). They
weave a “woof” and “call it Science” (19.2–9; E 78). But it is profoundly un-
clear here what “science” means. Moreover as the figures mutate (from
tent, to curtains and pillars, to woof), the referent of “it” is also loosened.
Does “it” refer to the tent/woof or to science? The two seem to inhabit the
copula of a (non)identity. And does “science” refer to the life sciences
that thwart a Hegelian narrative of spirit, which the Eternals must there-
fore cordon off with a tent? Or is “it” the systematized knowledge that the
Eternals impose on this mess to “bind in the Void” opened by these new
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sciences (19.3; E 78), which tent they “call” science in the older sense of
an architectonic system, as they confess through this paleonym the more
modern sciences they repress? After all the Eternals are said to weave
“curtains of darkness,” aligning them with superstition (19.5; E 78), and
the woof they weave may be science as a web of errors or the web of er-
rors they weave in calling “it” science.
Equally unclear is the text’s chronology, since theEternals exileUrizen
to the north before they themselves can logically exist (2.3; E 70), given
that in eternity there are no entities with defined agency. Thus rather
than read the poem as an explanatory history whose diagnosis of things
as they are removes our mind-forged manacles, I suggest that it opens in
several windows that look onto an impasse: geology in chapter 1, physics
in chapter 2, biology and embryology thereafter, and lastly anthropology
as the ant-like scattering of the peoples into tribes. Indeed the Lambeth
books as a whole can be read nonsequentially, as opening various win-
dows onto this impasse: history andmyth in the Continental prophecies,
art in The Book of Los, the sciences in Urizen—all paths on which Blake
stalls.
Both Blake and Hegel want to see matter as self-assembling into or-
ganized life, though Blake is far closer to grasping the disaster of an im-
manencewithout transcendent guarantees.Hegel’s norm is a bodywhose
essence is expressed in and fully determines its members, an ideal that re-
turns and is also problematized in his Aesthetics and even more brutally
disfigured inBlake’sUrizen books, includingTheBook of Ahania andThe
Book of Los. Crucial for Hegel is his distinction of “parts” (Teile), which
come together only as aggregates, from “members” (Glieder), which con-
tribute to a whole that determines them. Thus the plant cannot “hold its
members” together as it spreads and divides, “fall[ing] apart into a num-
ber of individuals,” while the animal is a “subjective unity of members”
(Nature 276–77, 303). The body that has made its parts and qualities its
properties and taken possession of itself is also a model for the integrity
of knowledge. Kant had used this body as the co-inherence of parts and
whole to figure science architectonically as a system from which there
can be no subtractions or contingent additions, no mutilations or trans-
plants (690). ImmersingKant’sfigure in the actualmateriality of bodies—
where an animal, unlike a polypus, cannot lose a limbwithout suffering—
Hegel writes proactively that the sciences must become a particular kind
of body: an “organism,” not an “aggregate” (Nature 6, 444). Yet not only
does the Philosophy of Nature not hold its members together. For it grew
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over twenty-six years through additions that exceeded Hegel’s constant
attempts at schematizing and reschematizing it. Moreover, in themiddle
of this process, whenHegel absorbed his earlier Jenamaterial into theEn-
cyclopedia and organized it as a Stufenfolge der Wissenschaften, he also
narrativized the Philosophy of Nature as a phenomenology of spirit that
struggles with the labor of the negative—something he did not do with
the other two parts of the Encyclopedia.4 So not only does the Philosophy
of Nature, like Hegel’s larger corpus, not hold its members together, fail-
ing to self-organize as it experiences the “accident[s]”5 of its additions
and the pathos of its narrative alongside the logic of its schema(s). Its var-
ious sciences, though organized in what seems an ascending pattern, also
present a series of mirror-stages in which spirit repeatedly fails to find it-
self, as sciences are transferred into and recur in one another, troubling
any clear ascent.
In theory the progression through the major stages, or Divisions, has
as its goal the living, self-determining body as the telos of nature and con-
firmation of Hegel’s system. As Hegel’s early follower Karl Rosenkranz
(1805–79) explains it, Mechanics is the science of “matter in general,”
Physics deals with matter’s “specialization . . . through its specific force,”
and Organics with “the individualizing of matter through Life” (133;
trans. mine). Physics is thus the connecting link between dead and living,
embodied matter,6 but in the second Division on “Physics,” forces like
light, heat, and sound are diffused and have not yet taken form in a self-
determining body. These forces, like Shelley’s “shape all light” inThe Tri-
umph of Life, annihilate their matter rather than reveal themselves in
their parts. By the end of the Physics we reach an example ofmatter spon-
taneously organizing and arranging itself in the planets (Hegel, Nature
104). Yet the planets fall short in being a plurality of merely external re-
lationships. “It is only in life,”Hegel says, “that we meet with subjectivity
and the counter to” this “externality” (18). But as we move inside life in
the Division on Organics, it does not necessarily yield the shape or tele-
ology Hegel wants for the organic (275). The earth’s members are in-
ternally connected, but inertly; the earth is only an “implicit organism”
(278), a practico-inert of the unconscious. Then, in the next section the
plant ramifies into individuals; but relapsing from the planets in the pre-
vious Division, they are parts, not wholes, as the scale of disciplines fails
to support the notion of progression.
The animal is indeed an integrity. But curiously in the third subsec-
tion of “Organics,” on the animal organism, having staked his claim to
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the unity of the animal body against the rhizomatic vegetable body, Hegel
gives considerable prominence to disease and death. Disease is the mem-
ber’s withdrawal into a resistant negativity (428), but since the animal
body is a unity, its very integration means that a disintegration that was
superficial in the plant “derange[s]” the whole animal organism, as “one
wheel . . . ma[kes] itself the centre” (433). Moreover, it is in this subsec-
tion that Hegel takes up physiology in onto-psychic ways, though in his
immediately preceding account of the functions of the animal organism,
the assimilation of food, rather than being approached pragmatically
and descriptively, had already seemed a site of disease.7
In the further journey into the interior of physiology that Hegel then
undertakes, the tangled structures abjected onto the plant resurface in
the networks of the body’s internal systems of ganglia and nerve-threads
(364–65). Nor can Hegel cleanly separate inorganic from organic sci-
ences, so as to leave lower sciences behind. Anatomy is a struggle with
mechanics; bones are wood, he says (361), trying to allegorize them in
terms of consciousness, but conceding thereby a resistance of matter to
spirit at the heart of the body. And physiology is full of chemistry in
the accounts of the digestive and nervous systems and the phenomena
of sensibility and irritability. For Hegel chemistry is the death of the or-
ganism’s very Concept: it “applies only to what is lifeless,” and “animal
processes,” as living, “always sublate the chemical” (394). But if life is
thoroughly chemical, as Hegel also says (269), sublation may have to
mean not that we overcome the chemical but that we find organic signif-
icance in it, for instance as the psychosomatic. The psychosomatic is an
interzone that is throughout this section in the body’s irritable-sensible
chemistry, which unlike the chemical process inminerals, is imbuedwith
affect. This animalization or vitalization of chemistry also inflects Blake’s
texts, whose characters respond through affect rather than intellection.
That the human is only a subset of the animal for both writers, that it is
studied by science under the animal, is a further problem,making it as dif-
ficult to move from nature to spirit as from the nonliving to the living.
In short, the organism, in the metaphysical sense Hegel wants, eludes
him as he grapples with science’s ever-increasing “wealth of detail” (Na-
ture 444). Blake’s Urizen, as we have said, opens in several windows that
face inward into the darkness of this detail, as it too is concerned with the
making of a body/corpus.8 Chapter 1 stalls in the petrified world of geol-
ogy that, though outside human life, intersects with the human when Los
in The Book of Los attacks a “vast solid without fluctuation” that seems
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both inside and outside him, by madly unleashing flames on marble or
rock (4.3–9; E 91). The same phrase had been used in Urizen (4.11; E 71),
intervaginating the two texts. Chapter 2 of Urizen, on the Eternals, un-
folds in Physics: what Hegel sees as a Dynamic physics, rather than the
mechanics- and mathematics-based physics of Newton, about whom
Hegel, like Blake, is deeply critical (Hegel, “De Orbis” 2–4, 8). Thus in
Urizen “Earth [is] not” and bodies fuse into each other (3.36; E 71). Here
there is light, heat, and sound but no gravity, and thus no cohesion or
shape; qualities exist, unattached, as affects without subjectivity. Blake
idealizes this condition, but in Ahania the fiery beam of Fuzon never
consolidates into anything. And in Urizen, when the Eternals as pure,
shapeless force unleash their flames, Eternity opens back into the geo-
scape of chapter 1, thwarting their prophetic fury as fires, oceans, and
mountains are all “ruinously” mixed up (4.44–5.12; E 72–73). Thereafter
Urizen emerges over seven ages as a body in bits and pieces that frustrates
any evolutionary reading of epigenesis: a spine in the first age, freezing
over the nerves; then, in the second age, what may be a heart “shooting
out ten thousand branches,” in a zone between plant and animal that al-
lows psychiatry to leak into anatomy; then, in the third age, the brain, a
“nervous brain,” not a mind, which again “shoots branches / Round the
branches of [the] heart” as veins and plants are confused; still in the third
age, eyes “fixed in two little caves”; and then in the remaining four ages,
ears, nostrils, throat, arms and feet in the seventh age, but no head or
other body parts (10.37–13.19; E 75–76). Not only does this body not hold
its members together; the process of animalization, as the science of
Blake’s time calls it, is mixed up with vegetable structures, thwarting
any progression up the chain of being. Before this long attempt at evolu-
tion, the so-called Urizen had framed a “roof” that was also a “womb” in
which he himself is born, in a metaphysical prolapsis of cause and effect
(5.28–29; E 73). After Urizen’s emergence through seven ages, as Los tries
to hammerhim into shapewith “bellows andhammer,”we again revert to
the globule/embryo that is the globe or world: a “round globe of blood,”
“Wand’ring wide on the bosom of night” and “Trembling upon the void”
(13.37, 57–60; E 77). InUrizen’s last two chapters we leave this convolution
of embryology and evolutionary biology for a more linear anthropology
that includes the emergence of continents and races and the formation of
cities. But if this is an anthropology in the sense of an account ofman, it is
in no sense humanistic, as Urizen “in darkness clos’d, view[s] all his race”
(23.22; E 81).
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The Book of Los is a further window onto this disaster, involving art.
Taking up the contemporary life sciences’ pervasive concern with organi-
zation, a term central to Blake, and paralleling Idealism’s desire to see na-
ture as self-organizing into spirit,Urizen traces the emergence of organized
life frommatter, but as a question about whether the process can even oc-
cur. When matter fails to immanently self-organize into spirit, The Book
of Los then becomes a supplement that turns to art to impose formonmat-
ter. The poems share a disastrous narrative about geo-biological organiza-
tion, and disorganize the sequence Hegel will try to build in his Encyclope-
dia, which is based on Herder’s model of natural history leading to the
history of man. For in Urizen, unlike the Philosophy of Nature, we jump
from the formation of the earth to the animal, with the vegetable being
a lacuna covered over and returning inside the animal. Going back to
Urizen and The Book of Los, the visual plates that frontally assault us in
the former with “dark visions of torment” (2.7; E 70) likewise serve as ac-
companiment to the much barer Book of Los, which elaborates on many
of these plates.9 The texts, in other words, are conjoined twins, like Los
himself and Urizen, who is rent from Los’s side. But in The Book of Los,
Blake develops Los into an artist, a role that was less foregrounded in
Urizen. At the same time Los’s art is hardly Hegel’s classical art as the “ad-
equate embodiment of the idea” (Aesthetics 1.77), which parallels Hegel’s
concept of a body that is fully expressed in and determines its members.
Los’s manic and tortured struggle with recalcitrant material comes closer
to what Hegel calls “symbolic” art: an art that is pre-art, premature, but
which, if we take it seriously, calls in question the whole notion of aesthet-
ics as what Baumgarten calls the art of thinking beautifully (167). While
Hegel feels bound to dismiss such art, he is also clearly drawn to it, refer-
ring to its “sublime preliminary experiments” (Aesthetics 1.317). In sym-
bolic art, the idea is still “indeterminate,” and not yet “inwardly clear to
itself” (1.76, 352). Hence the artist “staggers around,” “adapting to the
meaning sought the shapes that forever remain alien,” as his art “distorts
and stretches” “natural shapes,” positing itself “as the inherently defi-
cient” (1.76–77, 317–19). Any binding of this chaos only results in a “bad
and untrue determinacy” (1.76).
Foretelling his role as artist, the earlier Song of Los ends with an image
of Los as blacksmith hammering into shape a globe or orb of fire, an orb
that, in Urizen, luridly degenerates into a globe of blood and a womb. In
the final visual plate of the Song, Los stands above this globe ofmatter and
forces, though the actual poem’s attempt to organize itself falls into bits
b l a k e , h e g e l , a n d t h e s c i e n c e s 29
This content downloaded from 129.100.110.065 on August 19, 2019 12:26:41 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
and pieces. But in the surreal, internal cinematography of the Book of
Los, it is not clear with what material Los works, and whether he is inside
or outside it. Los wrestles with marble at the outset (4.4–10, 22; E 91–92).
But at the same time he seems to be a blacksmith working in furnaces and
with bellows that become his own lungs, as Urizen, whom he beats into
shape, takes form inside him, in a collapsing boundary between mascu-
line labor and female, embryological labor. As such, the text deranges
aesthetics as the discipline of either the beautiful or sublime, as Los, as
much a victim as Urizen of Blake’s knowledge of embryology, sinks into
the amniotic fluid of the sciences, a “stifling black fluid,” that he struggles
to get out of only to sink back again (4.54–70; E 93).
In chapter 1 Los works at his furnace, but the fires yield no “light” or
“heat,” only “Coldness, darkness, obstruction, a Solid / Without fluctua-
tion” that is “Black as marble of Egypt; impenetrable” (3.49, 4.46; E 91).
Working on this petrified intelligence as unprocessed psychic material,
Los’s art consists less in sculpting matter into form, than in battering
forms of inorganic, resistant matter that break into pieces, revealing the
psychic void at the heart of imagination. For when the solid breaks into
“numberless fragments,” it is not clear whether this solid, “crumbling
with bursting sobs,” is the material with which Los is struggling or Los
himself as his psychic defenses and internal barriers collapse (4:19–21;
E 92). Given the enjambed syntax in which participles lack a clear subject
and may refer backward or forward, it is impossible to separate Los and
what heworks on.Nor canwedistinguish Los and thedisastrous environ-
ment in, through, and as which he emerges, struggling upon the “Spawn
of waters,” as his lungs, which are also the lungs of his bellows, “heave in-
cessant” in the drowning waters (4:70, 54–55; E 93).
The first two chapters of Los replay those ofUrizen: themarble, object
of aesthetic work, becomes primal rock, bringing back the earlier text’s
geological unconscious. And the waste land opened up when the myth
of Eternity in Urizen “roll[s] wide apart” (5.5; E 73) similarly appears in
The Book of Los when this rock “crack[s] across into numberless frag-
ments” under Los’s fury, creating a “vacuum” that becomes “element”:
a “vast world of waters,” winds, “furious torrents.” (4:18–25, 51, 66–67;
E 92–93). Simultaneously Los falls back in time, and through “Many ages
of groans” a body emerges in “Branchy forms,” its organs “like roots /
Shooting out from the seed” (4:27–33, 43–44, 64–65; E 92–93). And given
the suppression of proper names we also struggle to distinguish Los and
Urizen, the artist and his object, the process and product. For not only is
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Los “born” in chapter 2, after already existing in chapter 1; while Urizen
emerges as an outgrowth of Los and is abortively organized, Los’s falling
mind also “labour[s] / Organizing itself,” being born from inside himself,
as the bellows of the furnace become his own lungs, and the unseparated
cosmic ocean becomes the fluid inside the body through which “the
unform’d part” struggles up as a polypus, a plant-vegetable and it seems
a sea creature as well, which, from the perspective of spirit, is the trau-
matic site of a failure in individuation.10
After this psychotic crisis, over a further nine (not seven) ages, Los
succeeds in shaping an immense orb of fire into the sun, which stands
“self-balanc’d.”
Nine ages completed their circles
When Los heated the glowing mass, casting
It down into the Deeps; the Deeps fled
Away in redounding smoke; the Sun
Stood self-balanc’d; and Los smild with joy
He the vast spine of Urizen siez’d
And bound down to the glowing illusion.
But no light, for the Deep fled away
On all sides, and left an unform’d
Dark vacuity: here Urizen lay
In fierce torments on his glowing bed
Till his Brain in a rock, & his Heart
In a fleshy slough formed four rivers
Obscuring the immense Orb of fire
Flowing down into the night: till a Form
Was completed, a Human Illusion
In darkness and deep clouds involvd.
(5.41–57; E 94)
As Los shapes the “all brightmass” into a “Globe,” “quench[ing] it beneath
in the Deeps,” then heating it again, something is achieved (5.35–38): a
“form” is completed, the sun stands “self-balanc’d.”Los seems tohavepro-
gressed to amore articulated shape than in The Book of Ahania, where he
hadonly been able to “beat”Fuzon’sfiery beam “in amass /With the body
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of the sun,” whose shape therefore annihilates itself (2.44–48; E 85). But
this sun, like Los’s fires at the beginning, yields no “light” (Book of Los
3.49; E 91 and 5.48; E 94). Instead, as “the Deep” retreats on all sides, it re-
veals “an unformed dark vacuity,”where Urizen lies “in fierce torments,”
till the “orb of fire” is obscured in petrified and viscous forms, the “brain
in a rock,” and a “fleshy slough” that forms “four rivers.” It is as if, once the
mass is extracted from the process of being heated and quenched in the
inner depths, the end product loses something, of which Los is unaware,
as he “smil[es],” binding down “fierce torments” so as to reach a conclu-
sion, a bad and untrue determinacy. Themass, removed from the depths,
is an illusion, even as the material on which Los has worked, called
“Urizen,” is forced into a bad and untrue determinacy, a hard shape that
is viscous within.
These final verses are settled yet deeply unsettling. They combine a
Sartrean nausea in the last verse with an enigmatic beauty in the penul-
timate verse on the retreat of theDeep, which echoes but further denudes
the Kabala Denudata where God self-contracts to leave a space for crea-
tures to emerge. The passage leaves us with both a sense of closure and
a half-cicatrized wound. In these lines the poem withdraws from Los’s
paranoid-schizoid anger at the implosion of totalizing frameworks, into
a depression that intimates an aesthetics of “decompletion.” Kenneth
Reinhard describes “decompletion” as occurring in an ontological space
where there is no prior imaginary fullness, like that of the Eternals, for
which we must compensate, and he evokes Lacan to describe creation,
like “the potter’s fashioning of a thing around a void,” as occurring around
“a gap or a hole in the real” (54, 58). In Blake’s poem the sun momentar-
ily stands self-balanced only on condition of the deeps withdrawing, and
so as an illusion fashioned around a vacuity. When the sun, in turn,
withdraws, we are left with “the empty shell” that makes the poem’s “ex-
istence evident” to its readers (Foucault 156). The withdrawn sun will re-
turn in more modern texts: in Gerard de Nerval’s “soleil noir de la mel-
ancolie” in “El Desdichado,” in Kristeva’s Black Sun that evokes Nerval,
and in the “enclosed sun” and “solar void” on which Foucault writes in
his early book on the queer modernist writer Raymond Roussel (162–66).
Blake’s solar eclipse, or even solar death, in The Book of Los is at the be-
ginning of this aesthetics of decompletion, but as a breakdown and
breakthrough of which neither Blake nor Los (who by the end seems al-
most marginal to the text) takes ownership. It is simply there, on the
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threshold of a profound metaphysical and aesthetic climate change,
opening inward to no future.
notes
1. In the Philosophy of NatureHegel writes that nature “is only implicitly the Idea, and
Schelling therefore called her a petrified (versteinerte) intelligence, others even a frozen
(gefrorene) intelligence” (14–15;Werke 10.425). However, Hegel does actually quote the pas-
sage from Schelling that he has inmind in hisHistory of Philosophy, where it is clear that the
adjectives areHegel’s: “The perfect theory of nature would be that bywhich the whole of na-
ture should be resolved into an intelligence. The dead and unconscious products of nature
are only abortive attempts on the part of nature to reflect itself, but the so-called dead nature
is really an ‘immature,’ torpid, fossilized ‘intelligence’; it is implicit only and thus remains in
externality” (3.517;Werke 20.425). It is noteworthy that Schelling describes dead or anorganic
nature as “immature” and so still open to future development, whereas Hegel glosses this
description with the word “fossilized.”
2. Summing up his Identity Philosophy in an (1803) addition to Ideas for a Philosophy of
Nature (1797), Schelling writes that in nature “the whole absolute is knowable, although in
appearing Nature produces only successively, and in (for us) endless development, what
in true Nature exists all at once and in an eternal fashion” (272).
3. Hegel himself makes the point that the graduated stages are purely notional. As
against proto-Darwinian ideas of evolution thatwere already emerging inhis time, he argues
that one stage “is not generated naturally” out of the previous one “but only in the inner Idea
which constitutes the ground of Nature” (Nature 20). Or as Schelling also puts it, the Stu-
fenfolge does not claim that “different organisms have really formed themselves from one
another through gradual development,” but is an “idea” that lies “in Reason” (Outline 49).
Hegel’s construction of the Philosophy of Nature as a graduated series of disciplines formally
recognizes that it is about mind trying to grasp its subject matter (which is also to say that I
disagree with Stone’s claim that the text is an a priori reading of nature itself). But beyond
this, I am also suggesting that this constructivism inevitably lays itself open to the failure
of the project.
4. The Encyclopedia consists of extensive outlines (Grundrisse) of its three parts: Logic,
Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Mind (Geist).We possess a more ample version of
the Philosophy of Nature, but like many of Hegel’s texts, it is actually based on notes from
his lectures, edited after his death by K. L. Michelet (1842/1845), who combined material
from the “outlines” in the three editions of the Encyclopedia that Hegel published (1817,
1827, 1830) with elaborations in his actual lectures for whichHegel left notes andwhichMi-
chelet attended. Hegel gave those lectures eight times from 1804 to 1830, in Jena, Heidel-
berg, and Berlin.
5. In the Phenomenology Hegel writes that the “circle that remains self-enclosed . . .
holds its moments together,” but that “an accident as such, detached from what circum-
scribes it” can “attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom,”which “is the tremen-
dous power of the negative” (18–19).
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6. Hegel wavers between placing the material he has in the second Division of the Phi-
losophy of Nature on the side of the inorganic or the organic. In general (though not in the
1805/6 Jena lectures), Hegel’s outlines, including the bare-bones Propaedeutic (1808–11)
and Nürnberg Encyclopedia (1812), haveMathematik (by which he means time and space)
as the first Division. In these arrangements Mechanik is the first part of Physik (which at
the time meant natural science). It is not until the 1827 Encyclopedia that Hegel makes
Mechanik the first Division, stops using the phrase Physik des Unorganischen in contrast
to Physik des Organischen, and renames the third Division Organik. In other words he re-
constitutes Physik as a bridge between the inorganic and organic, which it had always been
for Schelling.
7. On these sections of the Philosophy of Nature, see my article “Indigestible Material,”
which deals with digestion and disease.
8. For Blake as for Hegel, the body is an autoreferential figure for his system; see my ar-
ticle “Blake’s Body without Organs.”
9. For instance, the plate in Urizen showing a figure struggling upward in the waters
(Plate 5 in Copy C, 11 in Copy D, and 6 in Copy G) is described in detail in chapter 3 of
The Book of Los (4.54–5.5; E 93).
10. Interestingly, Charles Bonnet, who wants to see the gradation of being as having
no gaps, may be unique in viewing the polypus positively, as he argues that it proves the
continuity between the vegetable and animal, though he concedes an absolute disconti-
nuity between mineral and vegetable, the “gradation” here being “interrupted” (1.220).
Coleridge in his Theory of Life protects individuation by seeing “vegetation” and “animal-
ization” as going in different directions, but the polypi and corals form a disturbing excep-
tion to the cleanness of this separation (2.538–39).
works cited
Baumgarten, Alexander.Metaphysica. Halle: 1779.
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Translated by John Osborne,
Verso, 1992.
Blake, William. The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake. Edited by David V.
Erdman, rev. ed., U of California P, 1982.
Bonnet, Charles. Considérations sur les Corps Organisés. 2 vols., Marc-Michel Rey, 1762.
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. ShorterWorks and Fragments. Edited byH. J. and J. R. de J. Jack-
son. 2 vols., Princeton UP, 1995.
Connolly, Tristanne.William Blake and the Body. Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Foucault,Michel.Death and the Labyrinth: TheWorld of RaymondRoussel. 1963. Translated
by Charles Ruas, U of California P, 1986.
Hegel,G.W.F.Aesthetics: Lectures onFineArt. TranslatedbyT.M.Knox, 2 vols.,Clarendon,
1975.
———. “DeOrbis Planetarum.” Translated from the Latin by David Healan, 2006. http://he
gel.net/en/v2123healan.htm. Accessed 22 December 2015.
———. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 1892. Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances
H. Simson, 3 vols., U of Nebraska P, 1995.
34 t h e w o r d s w o r t h c i r c l e | v 5 0 / n 1 2 0 1 9
This content downloaded from 129.100.110.065 on August 19, 2019 12:26:41 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
———. Phenomenonology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford UP, 1977.
———. Philosophy of Nature. 1830. Translated by A. V. Miller, Clarendon, 1970.
———. Werke. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols., Suhrkamp,
1969–79.
Kant, Immanuel.Critique ofPureReason. Translated and editedbyPaulGuyer andAllenW.
Wood, Cambridge UP, 1998.
Krell, David Farrell. Contagion: Sexuality, Disease, and Death in German Idealism and Ro-
manticism. Indiana UP, 1999.
Rajan, Tilottama. “Blake’s Body without Organs: The Autogenesis of the System in the
Lambeth Books.” European Romantic Review, vol. 26, no. 3, 2015, pp. 357–66.
———. “(In)Digestible Material: Illness and Dialectic in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature.”
Cultures of Taste/Theories of Appetite: Eating Romanticism, edited by Timothy Mor-
ton, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004, pp. 217–36.
Reinhard, Kenneth. “Universalism and the Jewish Exception: Lacan, Badiou, Rosenzweig.”
The Dark God. Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious, 2005, pp. 43–71.
Rosenkranz, Karl. Hegel’s Naturphilosophie and die Bearbeitung derselben durch den Ital-
ienischen Philosophen A Véra. Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1868.
Schelling, F. W. J. Ages of the World. 1815. Translated by Jason M. Wirth, State U of New
York P, 2000.
———. First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature. Translated by Keith R. Peter-
son, State U of New York P, 2004.
———. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, as Introduction to this Science (1797); Second Edi-
tion 1803. Translated by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, Cambridge UP, 1988.
———. Systemof Transcendental Idealism. Translated by PeterHeath,UPof Virginia, 1978.
Stone, Alison. Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy. State U of New York
P, 2005.
Wordsworth,William. The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 1850. Edited by JonathanWordsworth,M.H.
Abrams, and Stephen Gill, Norton, 1979.
b l a k e , h e g e l , a n d t h e s c i e n c e s 35
This content downloaded from 129.100.110.065 on August 19, 2019 12:26:41 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
